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Abstract
We contribute to the debate on whether stock-financed acquisitions destroy value
for shareholders. A stock-financed acquisition is a joint takeover/equity-issue event.
Using seasoned equity offering announcement returns, we estimate through linear
prediction and propensity-score matching the share price drop that stock acquirers
experience due to the financing choice. Net of this effect, stock-financed acquisitions
are not value destructive, and the method of payment generally has no further
explanatory power in the cross-section of acquirer returns. Our evidence is largely
inconsistent with the agency costs of overvalued equity hypothesis.
JEL classification: G14, G32, G34, D82
1. Introduction
Do stock mergers destroy value for shareholders? The extant empirical evidence is that
stock-financed public firm acquisitions are associated with negative shareholder wealth ef-
fects at the announcement, while cash-financed deals are associated with normal or even
small positive announcement effects (e.g., Travlos, 1987).1 The standard interpretation of
* An earlier version of this article was circulated under the title “Financing Irrelevance in Corporate
Investment Decisions: Evidence from Acquisitions”. We would like to thank the Editor (Steven
Ongena) and two anonymous referees for constructive comments and recommendations that sig-
nificantly improved the article. We are also grateful to Nihat Aktas, Yakov Amihud, Max Bruche,
Jarrad Harford, David Hirshleifer, Todd Pulvino, Raghu Rau, Pavel Savor, Enrique Schroth, Sheridan
Titman, seminar participants at City University London (Cass), Universita` Cattolica del Sacro Cuore,
University of Notre Dame, University of Piraeus, University of Reading, University of Surrey, as well
as participants at the FMA 2012 European Conference for useful comments and suggestions.
Golubov acknowledges support from the M&A Research Centre at Cass Business School. Travlos
acknowledges financial support from the Kitty Kyriacopoulos Chair in Finance. All remaining errors
are our own.
1 Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that, even in the long run, stock-financed acquisitions are associ-
ated with lower abnormal stock returns than cash-financed deals.
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this result is the adverse selection associated with public issues of equity, whereby firms sell
stock when it is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984; see also Baker and Wurgler (2002)
for a related market timing argument). What is not known, however, is whether the infor-
mation effects of the financing choice account for all or only part of the difference in the
returns to cash and stock acquisitions.
Relevant to this question is an argument offered by Jensen (2005) which has become
known as the “agency costs of overvalued equity” hypothesis. Specifically, the availability
of “cheap” equity financing in the form of overpriced stock may erode managerial
discipline and even coerce managers into making ill-conceived investments, particularly
stock-financed acquisitions.2 If this is the case, stock mergers should be, on average, inferior
investment decisions. Existing evidence of lower returns to stock mergers cannot discern
the information effects of the payment choice from the value consequences of the underly-
ing investment decision and may, in fact, represent evidence of suboptimal investment
predicted by the agency costs of overvalued equity hypothesis. In this article we improve on
the conventional event study techniques and develop a methodology that allows for disen-
tangling the two effects, ultimately providing new evidence on the value consequences of
stock-financed acquisitions and the underlying investment decisions.3
In essence, a stock-financed merger announcement is a joint announcement of a take-
over and an equity issue. If managers maximize shareholder wealth, the takeover should be
associated with a non-negative net present value (NPV). As for the equity issue, Myers and
Majluf (1984) suggest that managers—based on their private information—decide to issue
new equity only when they believe it to be overvalued. The market participants are aware
of this behavior and adjust the stock price downwards upon the announcement of
new issues.4 This implies that the announcement period return of stock acquirers
should be thought of as consisting of two components, with only one of them reflecting the
2 Other manifestations of agency costs of overvalued equity according to Jensen (2005) come in the
form of aggressive or even fraudulent accounting, partly in order to meet analyst expectations and
budget targets.
3 Non-information-based trading can also affect inferences. Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004)
show that downward price pressure arising from short-selling by merger arbitrageurs (who short
sell the bidder’s stock at the announcement of stock-financed acquisitions to offset their long pos-
itions in the target stock) can also account for a part, but not all of the negative announcement ef-
fect. To the extent that these price pressure effects are important, our estimates of the
shareholder wealth effects of stock-financed acquisitions as investment decisions are downward
biased. However, a potentially offsetting effect comes from investor inertia, which makes the re-
turns in stock-financed acquisitions less negative than would be the case in an SEO followed by a
takeover. We discuss these issues in more detail in Sections 5.6 and 5.7.
4 Alternatively, Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest a market timing framework with irrational investors
who occasionally misprice securities, and rational managers who take opportunity of overvaluation
by issuing the overpriced security, thereby reducing the cost of capital. Both the adverse selection
and the market timing frameworks imply overvaluation as the rationale for issuing equity, but the in-
tuition is slightly different: in Myers and Majluf (1984) the overvaluation stems from investors not
having the full information set and overpricing the stock relative to what is privately known to man-
agers, while in Baker and Wurgler (2002) it stems from irrational investors bidding up stock prices
above fundamentals on sentiment.
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value-creation of the merger per se, while the other is reflecting the financing impact. Put
simply, the announcement period return to a stock-financed acquisition can be written as:
Stock Acquirer CAR  Takeover CAR þ Equity CAR: (1)
Therefore, in order to infer anything with respect to the investment decision (project selec-
tion) it is necessary to disentangle these two effects and to isolate the part of the announce-
ment period return due to the takeover announcement only.5
Empirically, this can be done by estimating the hypothetical stock price decrease that
would have occurred to a given stock acquirer when independently issuing public equity.
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) represent an ideal comparable event that makes this ap-
proach feasible. Indeed, the announcement effects of stock-financed acquisitions and SEOs
are similar—the literature shows that both are on the order of negative 2–3%. In addition,
stock acquirers and seasoned equity issuers share similar characteristics. For instance, both
stock acquirers and equity issuers experience stock price run-ups prior to the announce-
ment. Further, these characteristics have analogous effects on the announcement returns
across the two types of events. For example, announcement period returns to both stock-
mergers and SEOs have been shown to be negatively related to the stock price run-up and
idiosyncratic volatility. These patterns, reviewed more closely below, lend support to our
approach which relies on the parallels drawn between stock-financed mergers and SEOs.
Econometrically, we implement this thinking in two different ways. Our first approach
is to estimate the implied equity issuance confounding effect as a linear prediction from a
cross-sectional model of SEO announcement returns. This amounts to evaluating the char-
acteristics of a given stock acquirer using parameter-estimates from a regression run over a
cross-section of announcement returns in SEOs. In our second method, we draw on propen-
sity-score matching techniques and identify the hypothetical stock issuance effect by the re-
turns of the SEO issuers most closely resembling the stock acquirer in question.
The merit of these two approaches is that they allow for multiple dimensions (for in-
stance, firm size, valuation, relative size of the issue, and other characteristics) to be taken
into account in measuring the announcement return that would have accrued to the share-
holders of the firm upon announcement of an equity issue. The estimated value is then sub-
tracted from the stock acquirer announcement period return to yield a “pure takeover”
effect due to the takeover only. We test whether this net effect is, ceteris paribus, different
from the announcement returns to cash bids. If stock-financed deals continue to exhibit
lower returns once we purge the market reaction from the financing impact, this would be
consistent with the agency costs of overvalued equity story. In other words, we test whether
the method of payment has any further explanatory power in the cross-section of acquirer
returns after the implied equity financing effects are taken into account.
We begin with a back of the envelope calculation showing that the average stock price
response to cash-financed takeovers is close to the average stock price response to stock-
financed deals minus the average stock price response to SEOs. We then implement the two
approaches (linear prediction and propensity-score matching) and estimate for each stock
5 Note that if the takeover announcement reveals other sets of information in addition to the two
components we delineate, our approach is still valid for the purpose of our study: as long as the
additional information is not systematically different across cash and stock-financed deals, any
non-financing-related information will simply remain in the takeover part of the announcement
return.
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acquirer the hypothetical stock price drop that it experiences due to the implied equity issue
announcement. Subtracting it from the total stock acquirer announcement return, we
obtain the remaining “pure takeover” part of the announcement return. This is, on average,
not different from announcement returns to cash deals. This result continues to hold in
cross-sectional regressions which control for various characteristics known to affect ac-
quirer returns, as well as when we model the endogeneity of the method of payment deci-
sion. Taken as a whole our findings are inconsistent with the agency costs of overvalued
equity hypothesis, although we do find some limited evidence of inferior stock acquisitions
during the bubble period and for cash-rich acquirers.
To the extent that the market anticipates certain value-creative or value-destructive usage
of proceeds from SEOs, issuer returns and our hypothetical stock issue returns capture both
financing and investment effects. Hence, an implicit assumption we need to make for our
methodology to be valid is that value-creative and value-destructive motives/abilities are
evenly distributed across issuing firms, such that the average investment effect is zero and our
estimated counterfactuals are picking up the financing impact only. We address this issue in
more detail and further establish that the results are robust to restricting the SEOs sample to
(i) issues conveying little-to-no information about the primary use of funds raised (general
corporate purpose SEOs) and (ii) pure financing events (equity-for-debt exchange offers).
Our general conclusions also hold when we extend the joint-announcement argument to
cash-financed deals, decomposing their announcement returns into pure takeover and
implied bond issue parts. In addition, while we confirm that stock acquirers do experience
merger arbitrage price pressure as documented by Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004),
we also show that the implied equity issuance effects (adverse selection) appear to be the
dominant force behind the negative announcement returns. Finally, we extend our analysis
to private firm acquisitions, where we use private placements of equity (rather than SEOs)
to delineate the equity issue and the takeover parts of the market reaction. Here again we
find that, in all cases but one, the differences in acquirer returns between cash and stock-
financed private firm acquisitions disappear.
The results of our study have important contributions to the corporate finance and
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature. We provide the first evidence, to date, of the
wealth effects of stock-financed acquisitions as investment decisions (i.e., net of the associ-
ated equity financing effects). These estimates imply that stock-financed deals appear to be
non-value destructive investments. Furthermore, our findings show that the method of pay-
ment generally has no further explanatory power in the cross-section of acquirer returns
after the equity issue effects are taken into account. This result runs contrary to the predic-
tions of Jensen (2005) regarding the agency costs of overvalued equity, at least with respect
to stock-financed acquisitions in our overall sample. Finally, we propose methods, based on
comparable events, allowing for the estimation of confounding effects in joint-type an-
nouncements, which could be applied in other contexts.
Our study is most closely related to the work of Savor and Lu (2009), Bhagat et al.
(2005), Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013), and Ben-David, Drake, and Roulstone (2014). Savor
and Lu (2009) examine value creation from the use of overvalued equity as means of
financing. We, instead, focus on the investment decisions underlying acquisition financing
choices (project selection). Bhagat et al. (2005) address the revelation bias in the estimation
of takeover gains in tender offers by utilizing intervening events such as competing bids.
We study all M&A deals and disentangle the takeover component of the announcement re-
turn to stock-financed acquisitions from the equity financing one by drawing the apparent
164 A. Golubov et al.
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parallel between stock-financed deals and SEOs. Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013) and Ben-
David, Drake, and Roulstone (2014) identify stock mergers by particularly overvalued ac-
quirers but come to different conclusions as to whether these deals hurt acquiring firm
shareholders. Our evidence further contributes to this debate. More broadly, our study fits
within the emerging stream of literature on the interactions between financing and invest-
ment decisions, such as studies by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003); Polk and Sapienza
(2009); Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009); Bakke and Whited (2010); Uysal (2011); and
Elsas, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2014).
The article proceeds in the following way. Section 2 surveys the relevant literature and
develops the core of our method and hypothesis. Section 3 details the M&A and SEO sam-
ple selection procedures. Section 4 presents the main results and comments on their implica-
tions. Several robustness and auxiliary tests are presented in Section 5, alongside a
discussion of possible extensions and limitations. Finally, Section 6 concludes the article.
2. Related Literature, Hypothesis Development, and Empirical Design
2.1 Parallels Between Stock-Financed M&As and SEOs
The common knowledge regarding the wealth effects of M&As is that takeovers of public
firms financed with stock lead to negative shareholder wealth effects, while cash offers are
associated with “normal” announcement period returns for acquiring firm shareholders
(Travlos, 1987). This differential effect is generally attributed to the adverse selection asso-
ciated with issuing public equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a model where, in the
presence of information asymmetries, managers are only willing to issue stock when they
believe it is overvalued. However, rational investors anticipate such behavior and perceive
stock-financed mergers as a signal of firm overvaluation, driving the stock price of such
acquirers down. The method of payment effect appears to be one of the most robust deter-
minants of acquirer returns, with this result showing up in virtually all M&A studies.
This pattern also extends into the long-run, as documented by Loughran and Vijh (1997).
Recently, however, Savor and Lu (2009) show that bidders who fail to consummate a
stock-financed transaction due to exogenous reasons (such as blocking by antitrust regulators
or competing bids) perform even worse than bidders who are successful in their pursuit of a
stock-financed acquisition, and that this result is stronger for richly priced bidders.6 These
findings imply value creation from the use of overvalued stock as acquisition financing. What
about the quality of the underlying investment decision? How do stock-financed M&As com-
pare to their cash-financed counterpart purely on investment grounds? These are non-trivial
questions; there is reason to believe that the quality of project selection may differ. Jensen
(2005) suggests that overvalued equity increases managerial discretion and even coerces man-
agers into making value-destroying investments, particularly stock-financed acquisitions.7 If
these agency costs are prevalent, stock-financed acquisitions should on average perform worse
6 Using a similar identification strategy (i.e., failed acquisition bids), Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi
(2015) show that cash offers reveal information about the target firm’s stand-alone value, while
stock offers do not. This is evidenced by partial as opposed to complete reverting of target firm
stock prices to their pre-offer levels in cash- and stock-financed bids, respectively.
7 Note that we can be totally agnostic about the sources of equity overvaluation; that is, for the pur-
pose of this argument it does not matter whether equity is overvalued due to asymmetric informa-
tion, semi-strong market inefficiency, or investor irrationality. See also footnote 4 in Jensen (2005)
for a discussion of this issue.
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than cash-financed deals. Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013) support this view and provide evidence
that stock deals driven by overvalued equity exhibit higher takeover premiums and inferior
long-run performance. However, Ben-David, Drake, and Roulstone (2014) show that stock
acquirers’ performance is the same as that of similarly overvalued non-acquirers, concluding
that stock deals underperform cash deals for stand-alone value reasons. We contribute to this
debate by improving on the conventional event study techniques.
Essentially, a stock-financed acquisition is not just an investment decision but also an
equity financing decision. For example, Rau and Stouraitis (2011) note: “A stock-financed
acquisition is a combination of a financing activity (an SEO) and an investment activity
(an acquisition). A cash-financed acquisition is more likely to be a pure investment.” The
extant literature on equity issues documents a stock price drop of about 2–3% around
announcements of seasoned equity issues (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and
Korwar, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). Although several explanations for this phe-
nomenon have been put forward, the empirical evidence suggests that the release of nega-
tive information about the issuer’s value—the adverse selection argument of Myers and
Majluf (1984)—is the most suitable justification (see, e.g., Kalay and Shimrat, 1987; Brous,
1992). We contend that since a stock-financed acquisition implies a stock issue, part of the
stock price reaction to stock-financed acquisition announcements can be attributable to the
associated equity financing decision. This has been recognized by researchers in the past.
For example, Hansen (1987: 77) writes: “[ . . . ] the analysis implies that exchange-medium
considerations can confound the estimation of gains from mergers: exchange-medium
choice signals acquiring-firm value, so there will generally be an effect on market value
with a merger bid that is additional to any created by the merger itself.” In addition, and
much in the spirit of our empirical design, Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990: 668)
note: “In general, the abnormal return to the bidder firm will consist of two components:
(i) synergy revaluation—the market’s revaluation of the expected synergy gain that is inde-
pendent of the information provided by the medium of exchange choice and (ii) signal-
ling—the revelation of the bidder’s private information concerning the true bidder/synergy
value that is conveyed through the medium-of-exchange selection.”
In fact, several stylized facts point out to the similarity between seasoned equity issues
and stock-financed mergers. First, both seasoned equity issuers and stock acquirers tend to
experience stock price run-ups prior to the event. Second, the effect of several determinants
of announcement returns to stock acquisitions of public firms and equity issues is similar
across the two types of events. For instance, the key intuition behind the Myers and Majluf
(1984) model is that the higher the information asymmetry, the more negative the market
reaction to equity issues is. Empirically, this result is well documented (for instance,
Dierkens, 1991; Lee and Masulis, 2009). Likewise, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz
(2007) document that high information asymmetry bidders experience lower announce-
ment period returns in stock-financed public acquisitions. Similar patterns are also
observed for the pre-event stock price run-up (see Asquith and Mullins (1986) for SEOs
and Rosen (2006) for mergers) and relative size of the issue/deal (see Asquith and Mullins
(1986) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) for SEOs and Travlos (1987) and Fuller, Netter,
and Stegemoller (2002) for mergers).8 Finally, Alexandridis, Petmezas, and Travlos (2010)
show that stock mergers do not destroy value outside the most competitive takeover
8 This is, necessarily, an incomplete list. One can find more similarities as the literatures on an-
nouncement returns to equity issues and mergers are vast and growing.
166 A. Golubov et al.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/rof/article-abstract/20/1/161/2461397 by guest on 29 July 2020
markets (USA, UK, and Canada). Incidentally, the negative announcement effect of sea-
soned equity issues also does not show up in less developed markets (see Eckbo, Masulis,
and Norli (2007) for a summary).
These parallels between stock-financed acquisitions and SEOs suggest that a stock mer-
ger announcement should be thought of as having two major components: an equity financ-
ing part and a takeover part. While this joint-announcement nature of a stock-financed
acquisition bid is implicitly assumed in Travlos (1987), no study to date has formally dealt
with this joint announcement problem.9 One exception is Bhagat et al. (2005) who show
that announcement period returns to tender offers are subject to revelation bias (i.e., infor-
mation about bidder stand-alone value and other information revealed by the bid plagues
accurate estimation of the takeover gains). With respect to the method of payment, the au-
thors conclude that the synergy gains in stock-financed tender offers are lower not because
of inferior returns to such business combinations, but because of the information conveyed
by equity financing.10 Our approach allows us to disentangle the two announcements and
to quantify the effect due to project selection.
2.2 Empirical Setup
2.2.a. Linear prediction
Our first approach is as follows. We start by running a cross-sectional regression of SEO
issuer announcement returns (ICAR) on issuer and issue characteristics:
ICARi ¼ X0ibþ ui; (2)
where X
0
i is a vector of relevant issuer and issue characteristics, and ui is an error term.
Then, using the coefficient estimates (b) from Equation (2) and the corresponding charac-
teristics of stock acquirers (X
0
jÞ, we estimate the share price effect that would have occurred
to the stock acquirer as a result of independently announcing an issue of public equity.
We label this hypothetical return as HCARj:
HCARj ¼ E½ICARj ¼ E½X0jbþ uj iff STOCKj ¼ 1; (3)
where STOCKj takes the value of 1 when the deal is financed with stock and 0 when it is
financed with cash. Now, let ACARj denote the entire acquirer announcement period
return, and let PCARj denote the part of the announcement period return attributable to
the takeover and not to the equity issue decision. Then:
PCARj ¼
ACARj HCARj if STOCKj ¼ 1
ACARj if STOCKj ¼ 0:
(
(4)
We then test whether STOCK has a significant effect on PCAR. That is, we examine
whether the method of payment affects the value of the acquisition as purely an investment
project, after the associated equity financing effects have been taken into account.
9 Travlos (1987, footnote 23) writes: “[ . . . ] corporate acquisitions financed via common stock can
be viewed as a special case of new offerings”.
10 Bhagat et al. (2005) study tender offers, which are only a small subset of all M&A deals. In add-
ition, they are rarely structured as stock swaps. Our study includes both tender offers and mer-
gers, and thus our results are more general.
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2.2.b. Propensity-score matching
The principal difference of our second approach is in the way we define HCARj, the hypo-
thetical stock price reaction that would have occurred in an event of an SEO by the stock
acquirer. Here, we approximate it by the announcement returns of the SEO firms most
closely resembling the stock acquirer in question. To identify these closest counterparts we
utilize a variant of the propensity-score matching technique. Our propensity score is esti-
mated by probit regression of the binary choice between a stock-financed M&A and an
SEO on a vector of characteristics identical to that in Equations (2) and (3). Our premise is
that stock acquirers sharing characteristics of the SEO issuers would have likely experi-
enced similar announcement effects. We use one-to-one and n-nearest-neighbors matching.
Maintaining our earlier notation where subscript i denotes SEO firms and subscript j de-
notes M&A firms, for one-to-one matching we have:
HCARj ¼ ICARi iff STOCKj ¼ 1; (5)
such that i’s propensity score is closest to that of j. For n-nearest-neighbors matching we
have:
HCARj ¼ 1
n
X
i
ICARi iff STOCKj ¼ 1; (6)
where i belongs to the set of n SEO issuers with propensity scores closest to that of j. We set
n¼ 10 and n¼ 50; alternative definitions yield similar results. We also experiment with ker-
nel-based matching (Gaussian and Epanechnikov kernels) whereby all SEO firms are used
as matches but weighted according to their propensity score distances and again find simi-
lar results. Having estimated HCARj in these alternative ways we proceed as above and
Equation (4) still governs the definition of PCARj.
3. Sample Selection
3.1 M&A Sample
Our sample of M&As comes from Thomson Financial SDC M&A Database and covers the
period from January 1 1985 to December 31 2009.11 To be included in the sample, the
transaction has to satisfy the following criteria:
1. The bidder and the target are US public firms.
2. The deal is completed, and is not classified as a bankruptcy acquisition, going private
transaction, leveraged buyout, liquidation, privatization, repurchase, reverse takeover,
or restructuring.
3. The bidder holds less than 10% of the target’s shares prior to the announcement and
obtains control of the target (more than 50%) as a result of the transaction.
4. The bidder is covered in the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database
(share codes 10 and 11, cases with multiple classes of common stock are excluded) with
sufficient data to calculate announcement period returns.
5. The transaction value is at least $1M and represents at least 1% of bidder market capit-
alization measured 30 days prior to the announcement of the deal.
11 SDC’s coverage of both M&As and SEOs prior to 1985 appears sparse.
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6. The method of payment is either 100% cash or 100% stock. Mixed offers are excluded
to yield a clean experiment; however, in the online Appendix we relax this requirement
and report the results including mixed cash/stock deals.
These screens are standard in the M&A literature (see, e.g., Masulis, Wang, and
Xie, 2007). There are 3,002 deals that satisfy the above selection criteria. Out of these,
1,011 are pure cash-financed, and the remaining 1,991 are pure stock-financed
transactions.12 The necessary control variables required for implementing our analysis are
available for 2,576 observations (1,665 stock and 911 cash). The final M&A sample sum-
mary statistics are presented in Table I.
3.2 SEO Sample
The SEO sample comes from Thomson Financial SDC New Issues Database and covers the
period from January 1 1985 to December 31 2009. To be included in the sample, the issue
has to conform to the following criteria:
1. The issuer is a US public firm offering common stock listed on NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ.
2. The issue is offered to the US public (non-domestic and simultaneous domestic-
international offers are excluded).
3. The issue is not classified as a rights issue or a shelf offering, and is not accompanied by
simultaneous offers of securities of other types (warrants or units).
4. The issuer offers only primary shares or a combination of primary and secondary shares
(pure secondary offers are excluded).
5. The issuer is covered in CRSP database (share codes 10 and 11, which excludes closed-
end funds, unit investment trusts, real estate investment trusts, and American
Depositary Receipts) with sufficient data to calculate announcement period returns.
Again, these screens are common in the SEOs literature (see, e.g., Eckbo, Masulis and
Norli, 2000; Lee and Masulis, 2009). There are 3,780 SEOs that satisfy these criteria, and
the necessary control variables are available for 3,212 observations. Table II presents
summary statistics for the final SEO sample.
4. Empirical Findings
4.1 First Estimates
M&A and SEO samples similar to those used in our study have been extensively studied;
therefore, we omit a detailed discussion of the sample statistics apart from noting that they
12 A related stream of literature examines the effects of the source of financing as opposed to the
method of payment (medium of exchange). Analyzing a sample of 623 cash-financed deals,
Schlingemann (2004) shows that deals where cash is likely to have come from prior equity issues
are associated with higher bidder returns, which he attributes to the resolution of uncertainty re-
garding the use of the funds raised. Bidder returns were not found to be related to the amount of
ex-ante debt financing. In a different study, however, Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) show that
in a sample of 116 cash-financed tender offers the use of bank debt for deal financing is associ-
ated with higher bidder returns (Martynova and Renneboog (2009) report similar findings for a
sample of European M&As). Since our focus is the method of payment, we abstract from the sour-
ces of financing and treat all cash-financed deals as a single category.
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Table I.M&A sample descriptive statistics
The table presents sample descriptive statistics for a sample of successful US public acquisi-
tions over the period between January 1 1985 and December 31 2009 drawn from the Thomson
Financial SDC M&A Database. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Panels A–C are for all
deals, stock deals, and cash deals, respectively. Panel D presents the yearly composition, and
Panel E the industry composition of the sample. N denotes the number of observations. Dollar
values are inflation-adjusted to the level of 2009 using the US GDP deflator. All continuous vari-
ables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max
Panel A: All
MARCAP ($ mil.) 2,576 7,179.097 18,281.350 12.413 316.908 1,257.557 5,067.570 121,753.100
BEME 2,576 0.476 0.354 0.019 0.243 0.400 0.618 2.143
RUN-UP 2,576 0.131 0.525 0.681 0.139 0.044 0.256 2.899
SIGMA 2,576 0.027 0.017 0.008 0.015 0.022 0.032 0.098
LEVERAGE 2,576 0.187 0.159 0.000 0.058 0.161 0.274 0.697
CASH HOLD 2,576 0.156 0.191 0.002 0.031 0.068 0.207 0.832
OPER PERFORM 2,576 0.085 0.135 0.543 0.027 0.081 0.166 0.365
CF/EQ 2,576 0.049 0.130 0.797 0.032 0.058 0.093 0.339
DEAL VALUE
($ mil.)
2,576 964.475 2,683.313 4.050 55.030 172.035 563.000 18,529.400
RELSIZE 2,576 0.319 0.413 0.011 0.056 0.163 0.409 2.474
DIVERSIFIC 2,576 0.321 0.467 0 0 0 1 1
HOSTILE 2,576 0.016 0.125 0 0 0 0 1
TENDER 2,576 0.173 0.378 0 0 0 0 1
MULTIBID 2,576 0.036 0.188 0 0 0 0 1
ACAR 2,576 1.31% 7.84% 26.06% 4.90% 1.09% 2.14% 23.34%
Panel B: Stock
MARCAP ($ mil.) 1,665 6,451.306 17,211.220 12.413 284.106 1,103.338 4,443.740 121,753.100
BEME 1,665 0.435 0.328 0.019 0.221 0.374 0.570 2.143
RUN-UP 1,665 0.182 0.597 0.681 0.127 0.074 0.300 2.899
SIGMA 1,665 0.029 0.019 0.008 0.016 0.024 0.036 0.098
LEVERAGE 1,665 0.178 0.156 0.000 0.053 0.149 0.263 0.697
CASH HOLD 1,665 0.162 0.203 0.002 0.033 0.066 0.210 0.832
OPER PERFORM 1,665 0.062 0.146 0.543 0.025 0.037 0.145 0.365
CF/EQ 1,665 0.032 0.136 0.797 0.025 0.051 0.079 0.339
DEAL VALUE
($ mil.)
1,665 1,149.202 3,157.049 4.050 54.000 169.620 581.500 18,529.400
RELSIZE 1,665 0.345 0.390 0.011 0.068 0.200 0.492 2.474
DIVERSIFIC 1,665 0.264 0.441 0 0 0 1 1
HOSTILE 1,665 0.004 0.060 0 0 0 0 1
TENDER 1,665 0.014 0.117 0 0 0 0 1
MULTIBID 1,665 0.016 0.126 0 0 0 0 1
ACAR 1,665 2.294% 8.339% 26.059% 6.176% 1.938% 1.458% 23.338%
(continued)
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Table I. Continued
N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max
Panel C: Cash
MARCAP ($ mil.) 911 8,509.254 20,032.140 12.413 365.141 1,600.106 6,159.875 121,753.100
BEME 911 0.552 0.385 0.019 0.288 0.459 0.714 2.143
RUN-UP 911 0.036 0.341 0.681 0.154 0.010 0.176 2.600
SIGMA 911 0.022 0.012 0.008 0.014 0.019 0.027 0.098
LEVERAGE 911 0.203 0.163 0.000 0.067 0.186 0.289 0.697
CASH HOLD 911 0.144 0.167 0.002 0.025 0.070 0.205 0.832
OPER PERFORM 911 0.127 0.100 0.543 0.050 0.133 0.186 0.365
CF/EQ 911 0.079 0.114 0.797 0.047 0.075 0.113 0.339
DEAL VALUE ($ mil.) 911 626.856 1,404.376 4.050 57.970 178.620 540.140 17,068.790
RELSIZE 911 0.270 0.449 0.011 0.043 0.107 0.289 2.474
DIVERSIFIC 911 0.425 0.495 0 0 0 1 1
HOSTILE 911 0.038 0.192 0 0 0 0 1
TENDER 911 0.463 0.499 0 0 0 1 1
MULTIBID 911 0.074 0.261 0 0 0 0 1
ACAR 911 0.501% 6.446% 26.059% 2.764% 0.153% 3.273% 23.338%
Year All Stock Cash
N % N % N %
Panel D: Distribution by year
1985 70 2.72 26 1.56 44 4.83
1986 63 2.45 14 0.84 49 5.38
1987 56 2.17 19 1.14 37 4.06
1988 64 2.48 18 1.08 46 5.05
1989 46 1.79 20 1.20 26 2.85
1990 34 1.32 24 1.44 10 1.10
1991 35 1.36 29 1.74 6 0.66
1992 35 1.36 25 1.50 10 1.10
1993 43 1.67 25 1.50 18 1.98
1994 171 6.64 132 7.93 39 4.28
1995 208 8.07 162 9.73 46 5.05
1996 175 6.79 137 8.23 38 4.17
1997 249 9.67 203 12.19 46 5.05
1998 257 9.98 207 12.43 50 5.49
1999 211 8.19 159 9.55 52 5.71
2000 178 6.91 133 7.99 45 4.94
2001 122 4.74 89 5.35 33 3.62
2002 71 2.76 36 2.16 35 3.84
2003 86 3.34 47 2.82 39 4.28
2004 83 3.22 41 2.46 42 4.61
2005 67 2.60 33 1.98 34 3.73
2006 90 3.49 28 1.68 62 6.81
2007 74 2.87 18 1.08 56 6.15
2008 44 1.71 18 1.08 26 2.85
2009 44 1.71 22 1.32 22 2.41
Total 2,576 100.00 1,665 100.00 911 100.00
(continued)
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Table I. Continued
Year All Stock Cash
N % N % N %
Panel E: Distribution by Fama-French 48 industries
Agriculture 5 0.19 4 0.20 1 0.11
Food products 16 0.62 8 0.40 8 0.88
Tobacco products 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Recreation 12 0.47 7 0.35 5 0.55
Entertainment 18 0.70 11 0.55 7 0.77
Printing and publishing 17 0.66 3 0.15 14 1.54
Consumer goods 27 1.05 10 0.50 17 1.87
Apparel 14 0.54 4 0.20 10 1.10
Healthcare 45 1.75 37 1.86 8 0.88
Medical equipment 68 2.64 42 2.11 26 2.85
Pharmaceutical products 113 4.39 76 3.82 37 4.06
Chemicals 26 1.01 8 0.40 18 1.98
Rubber and plastic products 12 0.47 3 0.15 9 0.99
Textiles 6 0.23 1 0.05 5 0.55
Construction materials 24 0.93 6 0.30 18 1.98
Construction 8 0.31 4 0.20 4 0.44
Steel works, etc. 24 0.93 10 0.50 14 1.54
Fabricated products 3 0.12 0 0.00 3 0.33
Machinery 59 2.29 29 1.46 30 3.29
Electrical equipment 17 0.66 9 0.45 8 0.88
Automobiles and trucks 23 0.89 5 0.25 18 1.98
Aircraft 8 0.31 2 0.10 6 0.66
Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 3 0.12 2 0.10 1 0.11
Defense 4 0.16 2 0.10 2 0.22
Precious metals 5 0.19 5 0.25 0 0.00
Non-metallic and industrial metal mining 2 0.08 0 0.00 2 0.22
Coal 1 0.04 1 0.05 0 0.00
Petroleum and natural gas 57 2.21 40 2.01 17 1.87
Utilities 59 2.29 43 2.16 16 1.76
Communication 78 3.03 55 2.76 23 2.52
Personal services 13 0.50 6 0.30 7 0.77
Business services 335 13.00 221 11.10 114 12.51
Computers 141 5.47 82 4.12 59 6.48
Electronic equipment 134 5.20 91 4.57 43 4.72
Measuring and control equipment 55 2.14 24 1.21 31 3.40
Business supplies 21 0.82 10 0.50 11 1.21
Shipping containers 6 0.23 3 0.15 3 0.33
Transportation 37 1.44 11 0.55 26 2.85
Wholesale 57 2.21 28 1.41 29 3.18
Retail 73 2.83 38 1.91 35 3.84
Restaurants, hotels, motels 36 1.40 23 1.16 13 1.43
Banking 726 28.18 591 29.68 135 14.82
Insurance 76 2.95 46 2.31 30 3.29
Real estate 7 0.27 2 0.10 5 0.55
Trading 90 3.49 53 2.66 37 4.06
Almost nothing 15 0.58 9 0.45 6 0.66
Total 2,576 100.00 1,991 100.00 911 100.00
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are in line with prior studies. All continuous variables entering the analysis are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the individual distributions within each sample (SEOs and
acquisitions). Our conclusions are unchanged when we do not winsorize the variables.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of SEOs and acquisitions over time based on the distribu-
tions shown in Panel D of Table I and Panel B of Table II. It is evident that stock
issues are drying up toward the end of the sample period. The same pattern is observed for
stock-financed acquisitions; at the same time, cash-financed deals remain relatively stable
over time. Presence of a strong positive correlation between SEOs and stock-financed
M&As and lack of any correlation between SEOs and cash-financed M&As are consistent
with the findings of Rau and Stouraitis (2011). This evidence is the first empirical indica-
tion of the similarity between SEOs and stock-financed deals that we are advocating.
Since the main interest of this article is the wealth effects of acquisitions (and stock-
financed acquisitions, in particular), our main variable is ACAR, which is the cumulative
abnormal return of the acquirer in the 5-day announcement period centered on the acquisi-
tion announcement day.13 Benchmark returns come from a market model estimated over
200 trading days ending 41 days prior to the announcement (CRSP value-weighted index is
the market return). Detailed definitions of all variables can be found in the Appendix.
The mean (median) ACAR in our sample is 1.31% (1.09%). Both numbers are stat-
istically different from zero at the 1% level of significance. Partitioning the sample by the
method of payment reveals a pattern of acquirer returns consistent with Travlos (1987).
That is, cash acquirers experience, on average, a modest positive return of 0.50% (statistic-
ally significant at the 5% level), while stock acquirers exhibit an average return of
2.29%, which is significantly different from zero at better than 1% level. The difference
in returns between cash and stock offers is 2.80% and is also statistically significant at bet-
ter than 1% level. Median ACARs follow the same pattern.
We now turn to the return earned by firms announcing SEOs. The mean (median) issuer
CAR (denoted as ICAR) is 3.16% (3.05%), which is statistically different from zero at
better than 1% level. This is consistent with the extant SEO announcement returns literature.
Our main argument is that stock-financed acquisitions can be considered a special case
of SEOs, where the particular use of the funds is known. If that is the case, the announce-
ment period return to a stock-financed acquisition should be thought of as having two com-
ponents: a takeover part and an equity issue part. Then, if overvalued equity indeed erodes
managerial discipline and project selection deteriorates, pure takeover returns of stock-
financed deals should still be lower than those of cash deals. A quick back of the envelope
calculation based on the above sample averages does not support the agency costs of over-
valued equity hypothesis: subtracting the mean SEO return from the mean stock-acquirer
return yields a “pure” takeover announcement effect of 0.87%, which is economically quite
close to the 0.50% experienced by cash-acquirers. While being only suggestive in nature,
13 We focus on short-run announcement returns and not on long-run post-merger returns or operat-
ing performance improvements because our approach relies on predicting the hypothetical return.
Given the noise inherent in the predictions and the fact that this noise is expected to compound
with longer horizons, the use of short-run abnormal returns maximizes the signal-to-noise ratio of
our measures/approach. This also alleviates the usual complications arising from multiple deals
done by the same firm over a long-run window. While the results are noisier, the general tenor of
our conclusions is unchanged when we extend the event window to 30 or 60 trading days follow-
ing the announcement.
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Table II. SEO sample descriptive statistics
The table presents sample descriptive statistics for a sample of successful SEOs by US issuers
over the period between January 1 1985 and December 31 2009 drawn from the Thomson
Financial SDC New Issues Database. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel A
describes the variables, Panel B presents the yearly composition, and Panel C the industry com-
position of the sample. N denotes the number of observations. Dollar values are inflation-
adjusted to the level of 2009 using the US GDP deflator. All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max
Panel A: Variables summary statistics
MARCAP ($ mil.) 3,212 593.483 1,155.259 13.146 110.682 234.504 547.039 8,350.534
BEME 3,212 0.354 0.302 0.086 0.154 0.280 0.467 1.849
RUN-UP 3,212 0.680 1.039 0.545 0.074 0.382 0.926 5.858
SIGMA 3,212 0.036 0.017 0.009 0.024 0.033 0.043 0.099
LEVERAGE 3,212 0.227 0.203 0.000 0.036 0.189 0.374 0.817
CASH HOLD 3,212 0.212 0.257 0.000 0.024 0.091 0.321 0.929
OPER PERFORM 3,212 0.059 0.227 0.974 0.029 0.114 0.175 0.407
CF/EQ 3,212 0.041 0.126 0.529 0.007 0.056 0.100 0.383
DEAL VALUE
($ mil.)
3,212 82.370 96.009 4.223 27.878 53.718 97.493 655.529
RELSIZE 3,212 0.266 0.200 0.024 0.134 0.217 0.336 1.207
PRIMARY 3,212 0.562 0.496 0 0 1 1 1
COMBINED 3,212 0.438 0.496 0 0 0 1 1
ACAR 3,212 3.155% 7.510% 25.235% 7.339% 3.049% 0.951% 20.344%
Panel B: Distribution by year
Year N %
1985 158 4.92
1986 168 5.23
1987 125 3.89
1988 50 1.56
1989 98 3.05
1990 84 2.62
1991 245 7.63
1992 201 6.26
1993 247 7.69
1994 143 4.45
1995 273 8.50
1996 278 8.66
1997 226 7.04
1998 117 3.64
1999 99 3.08
2000 106 3.30
2001 60 1.87
2002 82 2.55
2003 107 3.33
2004 79 2.46
(continued)
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Table II. Continued
Panel B: Distribution by year
Year N %
2005 65 2.02
2006 64 1.99
2007 42 1.31
2008 33 1.03
2009 62 1.93
Total 3,212 100.00
Panel C: Distribution by Fama-French 48 industries
N %
Agriculture 10 0.31
Food products 19 0.59
Candy and soda 0 0.00
Beer and liquor 0 0.00
Recreation 30 0.93
Entertainment 35 1.09
Printing and publishing 11 0.34
Consumer goods 36 1.12
Apparel 26 0.81
Healthcare 128 3.99
Medical equipment 126 3.92
Pharmaceutical products 309 9.62
Chemicals 33 1.03
Rubber and plastic products 27 0.84
Textiles 10 0.31
Construction materials 28 0.87
Construction 38 1.18
Steel works, etc. 52 1.62
Fabricated products 0 0.00
Machinery 83 2.58
Electrical equipment 31 0.97
Automobiles and trucks 39 1.21
Aircraft 9 0.28
Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 3 0.09
Defense 3 0.09
Precious metals 7 0.22
Non-metallic and industrial metal mining 0 0.00
Coal 2 0.06
Petroleum and natural gas 144 4.48
Utilities 219 6.82
Communication 57 1.77
Personal services 31 0.97
Business services 372 11.58
Computers 151 4.70
Electronic equipment 261 8.13
Measuring and control equipment 59 1.84
Business supplies 12 0.37
Shipping containers 1 0.03
Transportation 91 2.83
Wholesale 118 3.67
Retail 172 5.35
Restaurants, hotels, motels 112 3.49
Banking 171 5.32
Insurance 61 1.90
Real estate 4 0.12
Trading 44 1.37
Almost nothing 37 1.15
Total 3,212 100.00
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this simple approximation provides the first evidence against the agency costs of overvalued
equity story.
Of course, the characteristics of the firms announcing SEOs and those announcing
stock-financed mergers can be quite different. A casual examination of the descriptive stat-
istics for the SEO and stock-financed acquisitions samples reported in Tables I and II
reveals that this is indeed the case. For example, SEO issuers are smaller in absolute size,
make smaller issues, and exhibit higher stock price run-ups. As a consequence, the
announcement returns of actual SEO firms and hypothetical SEO returns of stock acquirers
may be different as well. We therefore need to make sure that we subtract “apples from
apples”. To that effect, one needs to estimate the share price effect that a stock acquirer
would have experienced in the event of an SEO announcement given its characteristics
(HCAR). This implied effect can then be subtracted from the actual announcement period
return of the stock acquirer to arrive at the “pure” takeover part of the announcement
effect (PCAR). This is precisely what we do next.
4.2 Implied Equity Financing and “Pure” Takeover Returns
In order to estimate the share price effect that the stock-acquirer would have experienced in
the case of an SEO announcement (designated as HCAR) we employ the two approaches
outlined in Section 2.2. First, we estimate a cross-sectional regression of announcement re-
turns for the SEOs sample and then use the coefficient estimates to predict the announce-
ment effect that a stock-acquirer would have experienced based on its own characteristics.
Henceforth, we refer to this method as linear prediction. Second, we match stock-acquirers
to SEO issuers on a one-dimensional propensity score that is a function of relevant char-
acteristics, and treat the returns of the latter as the hypothetical SEO return of the stock-
acquirer—again based on the premise that firms sharing similar characteristics should
Stock Deals
Cash Deals
SEOs
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Figure 1. Evolution of the occurrence of SEOs, stock-financed acquisitions, and cash-financed acquisi-
tions over the sample period. The M&A sample includes successful US public firm acquisitions over
the period between January 1 1985 and December 31 2009 drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC
M&A Database. The SEO sample includes successful SEOs by US issuers over the period between
January 1 1985 and December 31 2009 drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC New Issues Database.
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experience similar announcement effects. Below we refer to this approach as propensity-
score matching.
Although the two methodologies to obtain HCARs rely on the same identifying assump-
tion—similar firms should experience similar market reactions—the mechanics of the pro-
cess of obtaining these counterfactuals are different. The linear prediction HCAR is,
effectively, synthetically constructed by extrapolating the coefficient estimates from the
SEO sample to the takeover sample and obtaining fitted values. In contrast, the propensity-
score matching method assigns actual SEO announcement returns observed in the stock
market for SEO issuers to stock acquirers with similar characteristics. There is no reason to
believe that one method is superior to the other; we will therefore draw strong conclusions
only when the two methods and/or most of the specifications provide consistent results
(i.e., whether the effect of stock payment on pure takeover returns is consistently negative).
The design of these tests requires us to identify variables that are (i) common to both ac-
quirers and equity issuers, and (ii) that have been found to have significant effects on the
returns of both types of events. We use these variables as explanatory variables in the cross-
sectional model of SEO announcement returns in the linear prediction method, and as de-
terminants of the propensity score in the propensity-score matching method (based on a
probit model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the firm chooses to issue
equity via a stock-financed acquisition, and 0 if it chooses an SEO). Based on prior litera-
ture, we include the following characteristics: firm size (LN (MARCAP)) (Lee and Masulis
(2009) for SEOs; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) for mergers), book-to-market
ratio (BEME) (Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) for SEOs; Servaes (1991) and Dong et al.
(2006) for mergers), stock price run-up (RUN-UP) (Bayless and Chaplinksy (1996) for
SEOs; Rosen (2006) for mergers), stock return idiosyncratic volatility (SIGMA) (Dierkens
(1991) for SEOs and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) for mergers), the relative
size of the deal (issue or acquisition) (RELSIZE) (Asquith and Mullins (1986) for SEOs;
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) for mergers), cash holdings (CASH HOLD) (Kim
and Purnanandam (2014) for SEOs; Harford (1999) for mergers), leverage ratio
(LEVERAGE) (Lee and Masulis (2009) for SEOs; Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell
(1993) for mergers), operating performance measured by the return on assets (OPER
PERFORM) (Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) for SEOs; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990)
for mergers) and cash-flow-to-equity (CF/EQ) (Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) for SEOs;
Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) for mergers). We also include calendar year and industry
(based on Fama-French 48 industries classification) fixed effects in these models.14
Panel A of Table III reports the estimation results for the cross-sectional regression
model of SEO returns (Specification (1)) and the probit model of equity issuance choice
(Specification (2)).15 In the SEO returns model, size of the issuer and relative size of the
issue have a positive effect on announcement returns, while idiosyncratic volatility and run-
up have a negative effect. The fact that high SIGMA and high RUN-UP issuers exhibit
14 We are not concerned with a potential selection bias arising from an omitted variable represent-
ing management’s private information about firm overvaluation and, thus, influencing the decision
to issue equity, because the management of stock acquirers should possess, and be motivated
by, the same type of private information when deciding to issue stock for financing an acquisition.
15 We use the same characteristics in the SEO returns model and the SEO/stock deal model because
our overarching identifying assumption is the same for both methods: similar firms should share
similar market reactions.
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lower returns is consistent with adverse selection behind negative announcement returns of
SEOs (and, consequently, stock-financed acquisitions). In the equity issuance choice model,
LN (MARCAP), BEME, and RELSIZE obtain positive coefficients, whereas RUN-UP,
LEVERAGE, CASH HOLD, and CF/EQ obtain negative coefficients significant at conven-
tional levels. Thus, firms choosing to issue equity via a stock-financed acquisition are
larger, have higher book-to-market ratios, make relatively larger issues, exhibit smaller pre-
announcement stock price run-ups, are less levered, and have lower levels of cash holdings
and cash-flow-to-equity. Propensity-score matching will help diminish differences in these
characteristics to make matches more comparable on these dimensions.
Our next step is to use the model parameters to estimate the hypothetical stock price
effect that stock-acquirers would have experienced in the event of an equity issue
(HCARs).16 The distribution of predicted HCARs is reported in Panel B of Table III. Using
the linear prediction method, the mean HCAR for our sub-sample of stock acquirers is
1.27%, statistically different from zero at better than 1% level. For the propensity-score
matching approach using one-to-one, 10-nearest neighbors, and 50-nearest neighbors
matching we obtain mean HCAR values of 3.19%, 2.53%, and 2.54%, respectively,
all significant at better than 1% level. Median values are quite similar. Thus, our stock-
acquirers would have experienced significant negative announcement-period abnormal re-
turns in the event of independently issuing equity via an SEO. There is also reasonable vari-
ation around the mean and median values.17
Panel C of Table III reports matching diagnostics for the propensity-score matching
method. We present the means of the nine explanatory variables forming the propensity
score model for stock-financed acquisitions, unmatched SEOs, and the three types of
matches. We also show their differences and the extent to which these differences are
reduced by the matching. We also report these for the estimated propensity scores
themselves.
While matching does not eliminate these differences completely in terms of statistical sig-
nificance, it dramatically reduces their magnitudes in most cases. For instance, the gap in LN
16 We use the exact specifications from Table 3 to derive HCARs; that is, all independent variables,
not just the statistically significant ones, are utilized. This is because our focus is on predicting
the outcome rather than on establishing statistical significance of a particular determinant.
17 The mean and median HCAR under the linear prediction method are noticeably less negative than
those under the propensity-score matching methodology. A natural question that arises is
whether such less negative market reaction would have been a realistic outcome given the differ-
ences between SEO issuers and stock-acquirers, or this is an underestimate and the market reac-
tion would have been closer to that of actual SEOs. We investigate this issue further and note that
stock-acquirers are substantially larger than SEO firms, and firm size (LN(MARCAP)) has a large
positive effect in the SEO announcement returns regression (and hence on the predicted HCAR).
It appears that extrapolating the firm size coefficient to stock acquirers may be problematic. We
re-estimate our prediction models without this variable and find that the mean and median HCAR
under linear prediction becomes more negative (mean of 2.10% and median on 2.23%), and
more in line with the HCAR under propensity-score matching (means and medians ranging from
2.07% to 2.72%). Replicating our further analysis shows that our baseline results for the PCAR
of stock-financed acquisitions and the coefficients on the STOCK indicator under linear prediction
are likely biased downward because of the disproportionate effect of firm size on HCAR, working
against rejecting the agency costs of overvalued equity hypothesis. We keep the size effect in our
baseline results to remain conservative.
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Table III. Cross-sectional OLS regression of ICARs, probit regression of equity issuance choice,
and predicted (matched) HCARs
Panel A of the table presents estimation results of a cross-sectional OLS regression of issuer
CAR (ICAR) on issuer and offer characteristics common to both seasoned equity issuers and
stock acquirers (Specification (1)). It also reports estimation results of a probit regression of a
choice between issuing stock via a stock-financed acquisition and an SEO using the same ex-
planatory variables (Specification (2)). Panel B presents hypothetical SEO returns (HCAR) for
sample stock-acquirers estimated via linear prediction based on the parameter estimates of (1),
and via propensity-score matching with the propensity score based on the estimation results of
(2). All variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics (Z-statistics for the probit regres-
sion) are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respect-
ively. N denotes the number of observations. Panel C presents matching diagnostics for the
propensity-score matching methodology. % jDiffj is the absolute difference in means for stock
acquirers and SEO firms, as percentage of the former. % D jDiffj is the achieved percentage re-
duction in the absolute difference in means for stock-acquirers and SEO firms resulting from
matching (negative values indicate increases in differences). The p-values for the differences in
means for the two samples are also presented.
Panel A: Estimation results ICAR (1) STOCK DEAL/SEO (2)
Intercept 0.0700*** 3.7337***
(3.20) (7.64)
LN (MARCAP) 0.0053*** 0.5131***
(3.78) (19.66)
BEME 0.0062 0.3505***
(0.98) (3.05)
RUN-UP 0.0073*** 0.6281***
(3.94) (12.15)
SIGMA 0.3550** 1.9037
(2.34) (0.66)
RELSIZE 0.0547*** 1.9757***
(4.93) (16.54)
LEVERAGE 0.0048 1.0005***
(0.57) (5.91)
CASH HOLD 0.0093 0.5382***
(1.01) (3.33)
CF/EQ 0.0183 0.6006*
(1.08) (1.83)
OPER PERFORM 0.0023 0.1718
(0.22) (0.94)
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
N 3,227 4,877
R2 (Adjusted R2) [Pseudo R2] 0.067 (0.043) [0.442]
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Table III. Continued
Panel B: Predicted (matched) values Linear prediction One-to-one 10 nearest 50 nearest
N 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665
Mean 1.27% 3.19% 2.53% 2.54%
SD 2.34% 7.73% 2.02% 0.77%
Min 6.84% 23.79% 8.18% 4.78%
P25 2.70% 6.04% 3.88% 2.68%
Median 1.48% 3.06% 2.19% 2.68%
P75 0.18% 0.74% 1.62% 2.36%
Max 6.45% 20.34% 3.01% 0.16%
Panel C: Matching diagnostics Stock-financed
M&As
Unmatched
SEOs
One-to-one 10 nearest 50 nearest
LN (MARCAP) Mean 7.007 5.530 6.792 6.580 6.529
% jDiffj 21.074 3.075 6.094 6.825
% D jDiffj N/A 85.407 71.084 67.617
p-Value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
BEME Mean 0.435 0.354 0.546 0.605 0.607
% jDiffj 18.569 25.604 38.992 39.659
% D jDiffj N/A 37.890 109.993 113.583
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RUN-UP Mean 0.182 0.680 0.153 0.138 0.136
% jDiffj 273.221 16.026 24.420 25.555
% D jDiffj N/A 94.135 91.062 90.647
p-Value 0.000 0.123 0.020 0.016
SIGMA Mean 0.029 0.036 0.035 0.038 0.039
% jDiffj 22.059 18.536 31.293 32.798
% D jDiffj N/A 15.969 41.860 48.682
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RELSIZE Mean 0.345 0.266 0.289 0.338 0.307
% jDiffj 23.027 16.377 2.056 11.110
% D jDiffj N/A 28.882 91.073 51.754
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.589 0.002
LEVERAGE Mean 0.178 0.227 0.175 0.186 0.184
% jDiffj 27.395 1.665 4.215 2.999
% D jDiffj N/A 93.923 84.612 89.053
p-Value 0.000 0.603 0.179 0.343
CASH HOLD Mean 0.162 0.212 0.157 0.161 0.157
% jDiffj 30.430 3.417 1.108 3.324
% D jDiffj N/A 88.772 96.358 89.075
p-Value 0.000 0.433 0.800 0.443
OPER PERFORM Mean 0.062 0.059 0.046 0.048 0.055
% jDiffj 5.369 24.919 22.817 10.657
% D jDiffj N/A 364.157 325.000 98.494
p-Value 0.589 0.002 0.009 0.230
CF/EQ Mean 0.032 0.041 0.015 -0.025 0.004
% jDiffj 25.787 52.529 175.787 88.248
% D jDiffj N/A 103.708 581.699 242.225
p-Value 0.033 0.001 0.000 0.000
PROPENSITY Mean 0.679 0.173 0.678 0.674 0.637
SCORE % jDiffj 74.593 0.144 0.807 6.223
% D jDiffj N/A 99.807 98.918 91.657
p-Value 0.000 0.924 0.589 0.000
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(MARCAP) is closed by 85.4%, 71.1%, and 67.6% for one-to-one, 10 nearest, and 50 nearest
neighbours, respectively. Similarly, 94.1%, 91.1%, and 90.6% of the gap in RUN-UP is elim-
inated. For other variables such as BEME, OPER PERFORM, CF/EQ, and in some cases
SIGMA, the differences appear to be aggravated by the matching; this, however, should not
be problematic as only SIGMA was a significant determinant of SEO returns in our ICAR re-
gression.18 The differences in propensity scores themselves between stock financed deals and
matched SEOs are insignificant for one-to-one and 10 nearest neighbors, while there appears
to be a significant difference for 50 nearest neighbors (the latter is unsurprising given that the
difference in mean propensity scores increases with the number of matches by construction as
one moves away from the best match). Overall, these diagnostics demonstrate that propen-
sity-score matching goes a long way in reducing the differences between stock-financed acqui-
sitions and matched SEOs, making our extrapolation reasonable.
Having estimated the implied stock price drop due to the equity issue component of the
announcement, we are able to estimate the “pure” takeover wealth effect for each stock-ac-
quirer by subtracting HCAR from ACAR of stock-acquirers. We call the resulting variable
PCAR. These figures are presented in Table IV. For the linear prediction method, the mean
PCAR for the sample of stock-acquirers is 1.02%. For the propensity-score matching
method, these figures are 0.91%, 0.23%, and 0.22% for one-to-one, 10-nearest neighbors,
and 50-nearest neighbors, respectively. Only two of the four PCARs are significantly different
from zero at the 5% level or better, and only one is negative. Therefore, stock-financed acqui-
sitions do not consistently appear to be value destructive as investment decisions. This find-
ing, in conjunction with the small positive returns in cash acquisitions, implies that the NPV
of public firm takeovers is, in general, modest. This is what should be expected in a competi-
tive market for corporate control. As a final step, we test for the differences in PCARs be-
tween cash and stock deals. The mean difference using the linear prediction method is 1.53%,
significant at the 1% level. The mean difference is 0.41%, 0.28%, and 0.29% for one-to-
one, 10-nearest, and 50-nearest neighbors matching, respectively; none is distinguishable
from zero at the usual significance levels. Thus, when considering pure takeover effects there
is no systematic difference in returns between cash and stock deals, which is inconsistent with
the prevalence of agency costs of overvalued equity. In contrast, when considering the con-
ventionally used entire announcement return (ACAR), the mean difference in returns to cash-
and stock-financed deals is a substantial 2.80% and highly statistically significant (at better
than 1% level). The median figures follow the same pattern, so we do not discuss them.
However, this univariate comparison does not take into account other determinants of
acquirer returns. In order to control for the possible differences between acquirers who
chose to finance their acquisitions with cash rather than equity, which, on their own, deter-
mine acquirer returns, we also perform multivariate analysis of pure takeover announce-
ment effects. That is, we take PCAR as the dependent variable and run cross-sectional
regressions of these returns against the method of payment variable (STOCK) and other ac-
quirer and deal-specific characteristics. For comparison purposes, we also run this regres-
sion with the conventional acquirer CAR (ACAR) as the dependent variable. Table V
reports the results of this analysis.
18 Some of the increases in differences, such as those for OPER PERFORM and CF/EQ, appear large
at first sight; however, this is misleading as it is due to scaling by values that are close to zero.
We have verified that our conclusions continue to hold when we exclude these two variables
from the prediction models.
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We start with the conventional announcement returns (ACAR) regression to serve as
our benchmark. In addition to the key variable of interest, the method of payment
(STOCK), we include all the variables used in Table III, because, as noted above, these
characteristics have been shown to affect acquirer returns. We also control for deal-specific
characteristics namely, a dummy for industry relatedness of the target (DIVERSIFIC) as
motivated by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), deal attitude (HOSTILE) as motivated by
Servaes (1991), the acquisition technique (TENDER) as motivated by Jensen and Ruback
(1983), and competing bidders (MULTIBID) as motivated by James and Wier (1987). The
regression is estimated with year and industry fixed effects, with standard errors clustered
at the firm level. This ACAR specification produces the well-known result—the coefficient
on the stock dummy is negative and highly statistically significant (in fact, STOCK is the
single most significant variable in this regression). This corroborates the results of many
prior studies, which have found stock-financed public acquisitions to be associated with
lower announcement period returns.
Table IV. Comparisons of ACARs, HCARs, and PCARs
The table presents univariate comparisons of mean and median ACARs, HCARs, and PCARs.
All variables are defined in the Appendix. Numbers in parentheses are p-values (significance
tests are two-tailed). N denotes the number of observations.
Conventional Linear One-to-one 10 nearest 50 nearest
ACAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR HCAR PCAR
All (1)
Mean 1.31% 1.27% 0.48% 3.19% 0.77% 2.53% 0.33% 2.54% 0.32%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.033)
Median 1.09% 1.48% 0.33% 3.06% 0.41% 2.19% 0.41% 2.68% 0.34%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011)
N 2,576 1,665 2,576 1,665 2,576 1,665 2,576 1,665 2,576
Cash (2)
Mean 0.50% N/A 0.50% N/A 0.50% N/A 0.50% N/A 0.50%
(0.019) N/A (0.019) N/A (0.019) N/A (0.019) N/A (0.019)
Median 0.15% N/A 0.15% N/A 0.15% N/A 0.15% N/A 0.15%
(0.237) N/A (0.237) N/A (0.237) N/A (0.237) N/A (0.237)
N 911 N/A 911 N/A 911 N/A 911 N/A 911
Stock (3)
Mean 2.29% 1.27% 1.02% 3.19% 0.91% 2.53% 0.23% 2.54% 0.22%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.266) (0.000) (0.278)
Median 1.94% 1.48% 0.63% 3.06% 0.77% 2.19% 0.56% 2.68% 0.46%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.035)
N 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665
Difference (2)(3)
Mean 2.80% N/A 1.53% N/A 0.41% N/A 0.28% N/A 0.29%
(0.000) N/A (0.000) N/A (0.300) N/A (0.377) N/A (0.357)
Median 2.09% N/A 0.78% N/A 0.61% N/A 0.40% N/A 0.31%
(0.000) N/A (0.000) N/A (0.088) N/A (0.499) N/A (0.536)
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The remaining regressions in Table V repeat this specification using PCARs computed
with the linear prediction method (Column (2)), one-to-one matching (Column (3)),
10-nearest neighbors matching (Column (4)), and 50-nearest neighbors matching (Column
(5)) as the dependent variable. If the coefficient on the method of payment variable is
Table V. Cross-sectional regressions of PCARs and ACARs
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis of PCARs and ACARs. All
variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. Year and in-
dustry fixed effects (coefficients suppressed) are based on calendar year and Fama-French
48 industry classification dummies, respectively.
Conventional Linear One-to-one 10 nearest 50 nearest
ACAR PCAR PCAR PCAR PCAR
INTERCEPT 0.0450*** 0.0849*** 0.0078 0.0410** 0.0407**
(2.63) (4.74) (0.32) (2.37) (2.56)
STOCK 0.0211*** 0.0059 0.0112** 0.0034 0.0038
(5.40) (1.49) (2.40) (0.86) (0.97)
LN (MARCAP) 0.0023* 0.0058*** 0.0005 0.0025** 0.0023**
(1.89) (4.88) (0.34) (2.11) (1.98)
BEME 0.0145** 0.0126* 0.0104 0.0137* 0.0141**
(1.98) (1.71) (1.26) (1.89) (1.97)
RUN-UP 0.0166*** 0.0107** 0.0157*** 0.0140*** 0.0155***
(3.69) (2.35) (2.93) (3.08) (3.50)
SIGMA 0.2163 0.5028** 0.2031 0.1646 0.2114
(0.99) (2.33) (0.78) (0.76) (0.98)
RELSIZE 0.0095 0.0417*** 0.0008 0.0113* 0.0099*
(1.63) (6.60) (0.13) (1.95) (1.72)
TENDER 0.0120** 0.0121** 0.0128** 0.0115** 0.0119**
(2.46) (2.42) (2.43) (2.39) (2.45)
DIVERSIFIC 0.0034 0.0021 0.0050 0.0035 0.0038
(0.86) (0.52) (1.04) (0.89) (0.96)
HOSTILE 0.0021 0.0138 0.0008 0.0008 0.0018
(0.17) (0.91) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15)
MULTIBID 0.0108 0.0083 0.0047 0.0106 0.0103
(1.20) (0.88) (0.48) (1.18) (1.16)
LEVERAGE 0.0173 0.0164 0.0202 0.0162 0.0175
(1.41) (1.32) (1.42) (1.32) (1.43)
CASH HOLD 0.0317** 0.0249* 0.0176 0.0284** 0.0295**
(2.24) (1.76) (1.05) (2.02) (2.12)
CF/EQ 0.0569** 0.0413* 0.0463* 0.0591*** 0.0538**
(2.48) (1.80) (1.85) (2.64) (2.41)
OPER PERFORM 0.0002 0.0042 0.0003 0.0022 0.0013
(0.01) (0.20) (0.01) (0.11) (0.06)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.113 (0.084) 0.122 (0.093) 0.044 (0.013) 0.080 (0.049) 0.086 (0.056)
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insignificantly different from zero, this indicates that the method of payment does not have
explanatory power in the cross-section of pure takeover returns even after taking into
account the confounding effects of other variables. This turns out to be generally the case.
The magnitude of the coefficient on the stock dummy is reduced essentially to zero and is
not statistically significant at conventional levels of significance for three definitions of
PCAR out of the four, and the only significant coefficient (one-to-one matching) is positive.
From the control variables, acquirer stock price run-up, cash holdings, and cash flows-
to-equity obtain consistently negative coefficients, whereas the tender offers indicator has
a consistently positive effect on acquirer returns, all of which are in line with prior
literature.
Thus, we are able to conclude that the method of payment generally has no further ex-
planatory power in the cross-section of acquirer returns after separating out the implied
equity issue effect (even after taking into account other determinants of acquirer returns).
This also implies that stock-financed acquisitions are not value destructive investment
decisions.
The above results appear to be at odds with the predictions of Jensen (2005) regarding
the agency costs of overvalued equity with respect to stock-financed acquisitions. The use
of stock by bidders is frequently taken as evidence of bidder overvaluation (e.g., Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 2009).
Jensen (2005) posits that overvalued equity increases managerial discretion by making it
easier for managers (and even coercing them) to pursue bad investment projects, including
ill-conceived acquisitions financed with “cheap” equity. This argument implies that, other
things equal, stock-financed acquisitions should be inferior investments. Our full sample
findings are inconsistent with such view, as we find that the shareholder wealth effects asso-
ciated with stock-financed M&As as pure investment decisions are very much comparable
to those of cash-financed deals.
5. Robustness and Auxiliary Tests
In this section we perform and elaborate on several additional tests. The results are reported
in various panels of Table VI. Given the repetitive nature of these tests, we only report the
coefficients of interest (i.e., STOCK and any additional variables and their interactions
where applicable). All other independent variables used in these regressions correspond to
those used in the respective specifications of Table V.
5.1 Wealth Destruction of 1998–2001
Motivated by the results of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005), who document
massive takeover-related wealth destruction at the turn of the 20th century, we further in-
vestigate this issue and re-run the cross-sectional regressions including a bubble period
(1998–2001) dummy and its interaction term with the STOCK indicator.19 The 1998–2001
period was associated with particularly excessive equity overvaluation, and thus the agency
costs of overvalued equity should be most detectable there. Panel A of Table VI reports the
results.
While the STOCK dummy itself obtains a positive and significant coefficient in three
out of the four PCAR specifications, the interaction term obtains a negative coefficient
19 For this test, we also drop the year fixed effects.
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Table VI. Further tests and robustness checks
The table presents the results of several additional tests and robustness checks described in
Section 5. Only the variable of interest, STOCK, and its interactions are reported. All other inde-
pendent variables are identical to those in respective specifications of Table V (except for Panel
A where year dummies are omitted) and are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics are based
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Symbols ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number
of observations.
Conventional Linear One-to-one 10 nearest 50 nearest
ACAR PCAR PCAR PCAR PCAR
Panel A: Wealth destruction of 1998–2001
STOCK 0.0167*** 0.0039 0.0132*** 0.0079* 0.0081**
(4.11) (0.93) (2.74) (1.93) (2.02)
98-2001 0.0047 0.0026 0.0088 0.0052 0.0048
(0.71) (0.39) (1.30) (0.78) (0.73)
STOCK X 98-2001 0.0145* 0.0126 0.0115 0.0142* 0.0142*
(1.86) (1.60) (1.31) (1.82) (1.83)
Panel B: Overvaluation-driven acquisitions (Fu, Lin, and Officer, 2013)
Absolute and relative overvaluation
STOCK 0.0217*** 0.0096* 0.0065 0.0010 0.0026
(3.95) (1.77) (1.00) (0.17) (0.47)
OV DUMMY 0.0057 0.0024 0.0012 0.0037 0.0048
(1.05) (0.44) (0.16) (0.68) (0.89)
Relative overvaluation
STOCK 0.0207*** 0.0089 0.0076 0.0019 0.0039
(3.49) (1.53) (1.10) (0.32) (0.67)
ROV 0.0075 0.0066 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077
(1.53) (1.36) (1.53) (1.63) (1.62)
ROV X STOCK 0.0064 0.0034 0.0013 0.0047 0.0064
(1.01) (0.53) (0.18) (0.75) (1.03)
Panel C: Governance interactions
STOCK 0.0142 0.0023 0.0085 0.0106 0.0101
(1.63) (0.27) (0.84) (1.22) (1.17)
LEVERAGE X STOCK 0.0058 0.0253 0.0022 0.0082 0.0058
(0.25) (1.04) (0.08) (0.35) (0.25)
CF/EQ X STOCK 0.0165 0.0011 0.0034 0.0160 0.0103
(0.37) (0.02) (0.07) (0.36) (0.23)
CASH HOLD X STOCK 0.0492** 0.0321 0.0217 0.0482** 0.0485**
(2.00) (1.31) (0.79) (1.98) (2.00)
OPER PERFORM X STOCK 0.0352 0.0327 0.0154 0.0360 0.0345
(0.93) (0.85) (0.38) (0.96) (0.92)
IND COMP X STOCK 0.1197 0.1201 0.1725 0.1245 0.1187
(1.02) (1.01) (1.23) (1.06) (1.02)
(continued)
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significant at the 10% level in two out of the four PCAR specifications. The effect of stock
payment appears to be somewhat different across the bubble and non-bubble periods. In
order to judge whether there is a negative impact of stock payment during the bubble
period, we compute the sum of the coefficients on STOCK and STOCK X 98-2001 and its
statistical significance. We find that the sum is negative and significant (1.65, t-stat
2.31) in the first PCAR specification (linear prediction) and close to zero and insignificant
in the remaining ones. Thus, there is some limited evidence that, when the overvaluation
(and the potential agency cost) was particularly high, stock-financed deals were perceived
by the market as inferior to cash-financed deals as investment decisions—consistent with
the agency costs of overvalued equity hypothesis. However, we refrain from overemphasiz-
ing this result due to the lack of robustness across specifications.
5.2 Overvaluation-driven Acquisitions
Our tests so far treat all stock-financed acquisitions equally.20 We now attempt to improve
on the results reported above by directly identifying deals driven by stock overvaluation.
Table VI. Continued
Conventional Linear One-to-one 10 nearest 50 nearest
ACAR PCAR PCAR PCAR PCAR
Panel D: Estimation (SEO) sample restricted to issues for “general corporate purposes”
STOCK 0.0211*** 0.0053 0.0090** 0.0065* 0.0087**
(5.40) (1.35) (2.01) (1.65) (2.24)
Panel E: Estimation (SEO) sample restricted to equity-for-debt exchange offers
STOCK 0.0193*** 0.005 0.0272*** 0.0004 0.0116***
(4.61) (1.17) (5.20) (0.10) (2.81)
Panel F: Decomposing ACAR for cash deals using hypothetical bond issue returns
STOCK 0.0211*** 0.0099** 0.0174*** 0.0130*** 0.0058
(5.40) (2.49) (3.50) (3.22) (1.48)
Panel G: Price pressure effects (Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford, 2004)
Deal Value at least $10M (n ¼ 2,439)
STOCK 0.0185*** 0.0023 0.0146*** 0.0060 0.0061
(4.51) (0.56) (2.95) (1.45) (1.48)
IMPACT 0.0187*** 0.0263*** 0.0189*** 0.0194*** 0.0189***
(3.19) (3.59) (3.14) (3.31) (3.22)
STOCK X IMPACT 0.0176*** 0.0295*** 0.0200** 0.0186*** 0.0177***
(2.69) (3.77) (2.53) (2.77) (2.71)
Deal Value at least $100M (n ¼ 1,454)
STOCK 0.0219*** 0.0121** 0.0123* 0.0020 0.0028
(3.92) (2.16) (1.82) (0.36) (0.50)
IMPACT 0.0204** 0.0317*** 0.0197** 0.0216** 0.0209**
(2.26) (2.70) (2.32) (2.44) (2.31)
STOCK X IMPACT 0.0432*** 0.0672*** 0.0302** 0.0430*** 0.0439***
(4.10) (5.17) (2.47) (4.21) (4.20)
20 We thank the referee for suggesting the analysis in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
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Specifically, we follow Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013) in using the market-to-book decompos-
ition of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, (2005) to identify acquirers that are
overvalued in absolute terms, as well as relative to their targets. To conserve space, we refer
the reader to Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013) for the details on the construction of the variables
used below.21 Results are reported in Panel B of Table VI.
In the first set of tests we use an OV DUMMY variable to indicate stock deals by ac-
quirers overvalued in both absolute terms and relative to their targets. Since this variable
can take the value of 1 for stock deals only, its coefficient should be interpreted as incre-
mental to that on the STOCK indicator (i.e., just like an interaction term). While the coeffi-
cient on this new variable is generally negative, it does not attain statistical significance at
conventional levels, neither in the ACAR nor in the PCAR regressions. To assess the overall
effect of stock payment in the case when OV DUMMY takes the value of 1, we again com-
pute the sum of the coefficients on STOCK and the OV DUMMY and its statistical signifi-
cance. This sum is negative and significant for the linear prediction PCAR specification
(1.21, t-stat 1.91) and close to zero and insignificant in the remaining ones.
In the second set of results, we use a continuous measure of relative overvaluation be-
tween the acquirer and the target (ROV) and interact it with the stock payment indicator.
Interestingly, we find that the ROV variable is marginally positive on its own, but its inter-
action with stock is again insignificant. The findings of these tests suggest that the agency
costs of overvalued equity in the form of inferior stock-financed acquisitions are not detect-
able (except for one case) even when we focus on deals that are likely driven by stock over-
valuation. Note, however, that these conclusions rely on the validity of the market-to-book
decomposition as a proxy for overvaluation.
5.3 Governance Interactions
It is possible that agency costs of overvalued equity are prevalent in firms where governance
is weak and oversight is lax. We therefore interact the stock indicator with proxies for firm
governance. We use free cash flow and cash holdings (associated with increased managerial
discretion and wasteful spending, see Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999), leverage (has a moni-
toring and disciplining effect, see Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell, 1993), and operating
performance (proxies for management quality, see Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). In
addition, we use product market competition (IND COMP) as an external governance
mechanism, which has been shown to overshadow internal governance (see Giroud and
Mueller, 2010, 2011).22 We favor these indirect governance proxies over the more direct
governance measures such as board structure and ownership for two reasons. First, we be-
lieve the indirect measures are relatively less susceptible to endogeneity because they are
often determined by the underlying fundamentals of the business that are not easy to
change. For example, cash flows that the business is generating are determined by the
21 We follow Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013) methodology with one necessary modification. While the au-
thors use the sum of firm-level mispricing relative to industry-year valuations and industry-year-
level mispricing relative to long-run industry valuations, we focus on the firm-level mispricing
component only. This is to avoid conditioning the market reaction on future information (as our
main variable of interest is announcement returns).
22 Following Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011), product market competition is defined as the sum of
squared market shares (based on sales) of all Compustat firms in that industry and year, with
industries defined using the Fama-French 48 industry classification.
Do Stock-Financed Acquisitions Destroy Value? 187
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/rof/article-abstract/20/1/161/2461397 by guest on 29 July 2020
profitability of the investment projects made many periods before; leverage is often deter-
mined by the industry norms, the type of assets available for collateral, and credit market
conditions; and industry competition is something the firm has little control of (short of
exiting the industry). In contrast, direct governance mechanisms represent conscious
choices. Second, the direct governance measures are available only for S&P 1500 firms and
only after 1992, which substantially reduces the sample size.23
Results are reported in Panel C of Table VI. We find that from all the governance inter-
actions, only the cash holdings interaction obtains a negative and significant coefficient in
the ACAR and two PCAR specifications, suggesting that the underlying takeover returns in
stock-financed deals become increasingly lower as acquirer cash holdings increase. This is
consistent with Harford (1999), who argues for an agency effect of large cash holdings. All
other governance interactions obtain insignificant coefficients.
Overall, we find only limited evidence in favor of the agency costs of overvalued equity
story. It is possible, however, that agency costs of overvalued equity manifest themselves via
other channels suggested by Jensen (2005), such as earnings manipulation or outright fraud.
5.4 Confounding Information in SEO Announcements
An issue of potential concern is the information about the intended use of the funds raised
in an SEO that is released to the market at the time of the announcement. If this informa-
tion has not been previously communicated to the market, then investors will also be react-
ing to this information, potentially confounding the estimation of the equity financing
decision wealth effects. The exact direction of the bias, however, depends on the market’s
expectation of the usage of the funds raised (i.e., value-creative or value-destructive invest-
ments). In treating SEOs as pure financing events, we are making an implicit assumption
that the value-creative and value-destructive motives and abilities are evenly distributed
across firms, such that the average investment effect is zero and the estimated HCARs re-
flect the pure financing impact. This assumption is in line with the findings of Denis (1994)
who finds that various proxies for the profitability of investment opportunities are not able
to explain the cross-section of issuer returns. Nevertheless, we perform two additional tests
designed to further alleviate the concerns that our HCARs are biased by the anticipated
wealth effects from the usage of funds.
To deal with this issue, we obtain the information on the intended use of funds raised in
our sample SEOs from Thomson Financial SDC. Table AI of the online Appendix presents
the distribution of primary uses of funds. While there are cases where the issuer specifies
that the proceeds will be used to fund specific investment, in over 61% of the cases the is-
suer intends to use the funds for “general corporate purposes”, which provides the market
with little information in addition to the capital raising decision. Arguably, these SEOs are
closer to “pure” financing announcements. Hence, our first test is to re-run our analysis re-
stricting the SEO (estimation) sample to these “general corporate purposes” SEOs. Panel D
of Table VI reports the results. The STOCK coefficient obtains a small positive and signifi-
cant coefficient in the three PCAR specifications using the propensity-score matching
23 We have nevertheless experimented with additional governance proxies used by Fu, Lin, and
Officer (2013), namely, board size, strong boards, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment
index, executive ownership, and institutional blockholdings. Only board size and institutional
blockholdings interactions obtain significant coefficients, but with the wrong signs (large boards
appear to help, not hurt, and institutional blockholdings appear to hurt, not help).
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method. This result is again inconsistent with the agency costs of overvalued equity hypoth-
esis, which predicts a negative coefficient on the STOCK indicator. Note also that this test
is conservative. Additional information regarding the use of proceeds is only an issue of
concern if this information has not been previously announced to investors (capital expend-
iture/acquisition plans are often announced in advance).
In our second, and even more conservative test, we restrict our estimation sample to
equity-for-debt exchange offers—those where the stated primary use of SEO proceeds is to
retire existing debt securities or bank debt. These are pure financing/capital structure events
and the market reaction to such announcement should contain no anticipated investment
effects, thereby allowing us to capture the pure financing effects we are after. Masulis
(1980) and Cornett and Travlos (1989) study exchange offers and conclude that equity-for-
debt swaps are associated with negative market reaction of the order similar to that in gen-
eral SEOs. Furthermore, Cornett and Travlos (1989) demonstrate that this market reaction
is consistent with information effects associated with financing choices. We select SEOs
with the primary uses of funds stated as “recapitalization”, “reduce indebtedness”, “refi-
nance/retire acquired debt”, “refinance/retire bank debt”, and “refinance/retire fixed in-
come debt”. These represent 25% of all SEOs. We re-estimate HCARs using these SEOs
and re-run the analysis. The results are reported in Panel E of Table VI. We find that the co-
efficient on the STOCK indicator is negative in one (one-to-one) and positive in another
(50-nearest neighbors) PCAR specification. In the absence of a consistent pattern our main
inferences remain unchanged. Overall, the results of these tests suggest that our use of gen-
eral SEOs as pure financing events throughout the article is reasonable and does not impair
our conclusions.
Finally, if one is not ready to accept that general SEOs or their subsets examined in this
section represent pure financing events, and maintains that the market reaction is still con-
taminated with the expected value implications of the use of proceeds, then our main tests
have another interesting interpretation. Specifically, if the SEO announcements contain
both a financing and an investment component, then by subtracting this from the stock-ac-
quirer’s CAR we are subtracting both of its implied components, and the PCAR for stock
deals is then the difference between the expected value consequences of stock mergers and
the anticipated use of SEO proceeds. If this value on average is not statistically different
from zero—which is what we generally observe in Table IV—then the conclusion one can
draw is that stock-financed acquisitions are thought by the market to be no better or worse
than the anticipated investment of the SEO proceeds. Comparisons with cash deals would
not be meaningful in this case.
5.5 Cash-Financed Deals and Bond Issues
We have assumed throughout the analysis that, for cash-financed deals, PCAR : ACAR,
i.e., no new financing announcement is made. Although cash-financed deals are more likely
to be pure investment decisions (announcements), not all cash acquirers hold enough cash
reserves to pay for the deal—some firms issue debt to finance the purchase (either outright,
or later on to replace any bridge financing received from the investment banks advising on
the deal). Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) present evidence of debt issuance following
large cash-financed deals. Therefore, a case can be made that, just like a stock-financed
acquisition announcement has an implied equity issue component, a cash-financed acquisi-
tion can imply an imminent debt issue. Consequently, the announcement return to a
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cash-financed deal (ACAR) should also be decomposed into PCAR and HCAR, where
HCAR should be estimated from announcement returns to corporate debt (bond) issues.
The existing literature on corporate bond issues reports insignificant returns to an-
nouncements of such issues (for a survey, see Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, 2007). Therefore,
our assumption of ACARs in cash-financed deals being uncontaminated by any financing
effects seems plausible, and we do not expect our results to be affected in a material way.
Nevertheless, we have obtained a sample of bond issues from Thomson Financial (SDC)24
and performed this analysis. Panel F of Table VI reports the results. In line with our expect-
ations, “purifying” ACARs in cash-financed deals by subtracting the estimated stock mar-
ket reaction that the firm would have experienced in the event of a bond issue does not
alter their magnitude in a systematic way: in one PCAR specification (linear prediction) out
of the four the STOCK dummy becomes significantly negative with its magnitude more
than halved compared with the ACAR specification, while in two others it is significantly
positive. Thus, we may argue that our main conclusions remain unchallenged.
5.6 Price Pressure Effects
Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) document significant price pressure on the acquiring
firm’s stock in stock-financed deals as a result of merger arbitrage trading, which requires
buying the target firm stock and short selling the acquiring firm stock. They further show
that this price pressure accounts for a portion of the difference in acquirer returns between
cash and stock deals. In order to establish whether our results still hold after accounting for
this price pressure effect we perform the following analysis. First, we raise the M&A sam-
ple selection thresholds to at least $10M, and at least $100M deal value, respectively (deal
size proxies for the feasibility of merger arbitrage trading). Second, we construct a variable
to capture the effect of merger arbitrage price pressure on the market reaction. This vari-
able, which we label IMPACT, is defined as the deal value relative to the average dollar
trading volume in the acquiring firm’s stock.25 The intuition behind this measure is that the
larger the deal relative to the usual liquidity of the acquirer’s stock, the larger the price pres-
sure effect from merger arbitrage short selling in stock-financed deals is. We include this
variable and its interaction with STOCK deals in our ACAR and PCAR regressions. If price
pressure is detectable, we expect to find a negative coefficient on the interaction term. Panel
G of Table VI reports the results (the first set of coefficients is for the sample restricted to
mergers worth at least $10M, and the second is for the sample restricted to deals worth at
least $100M).
The interaction term is negative and statistically significant in almost all ACAR and
PCAR regressions, and significantly more so for deals larger than $100M. As this variable
proxies for the price impact of merger arbitrageurs’ short-selling, this result is consistent
24 There are 17,729 corporate bonds issued by publicly listed firms during our sample period with an-
nouncement returns available (of them 10,707 by financials, 1,392 by utilities, and 5,630 by indus-
trial firms). However, most issues contain multiple tranches of different maturities, and Thomson
Financial SDC reports them as separate observations. We aggregate them into one by summing
over the principal amounts for each issuer-filing date combination, thereby obtaining 3,067 unique
bond issue announcements (filings). The mean issuer return is 0.10%, statistically indistinguish-
able from zero (p-value of 0.203), similar to earlier studies.
25 Average dollar trading volume is measured over the period of 30 trading days ending 6 days prior
to the deal announcement.
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with the price pressure effect documented by Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004).
The fact that the price impact is stronger in larger deals is consistent with practice (in-
deed, there is not much room for merger arbitrage trading in small stock-financed
deals). However, even after controlling for this price pressure effect, the STOCK dummy
continues to be negative and significant in ACAR regressions, while it is negative and
significant in only one PCAR regression out of eight, and positive in two others. This
evidence leads us to conclude that, while price pressure from merger arbitrageurs’ actions
does lead to lower announcement returns in stock-financed deals, the implied equity issue
(adverse selection) appears to be the dominating effect behind negative announcement
returns.
More broadly, to the extent that downward price pressure from merger arbitrage is sig-
nificant, our estimates of PCARs as pure value implications of stock-financed acquisitions
and the coefficient on the STOCK indicator in our baseline results are downward biased,
working against rejecting the agency costs of overvalued equity hypothesis. However, a po-
tentially offsetting effect may stem from investor inertia, which we discuss next.
5.7 Investor Inertia
The implicit assumption behind our methodological approach is that the magnitude of the
stock price reactions in SEOs and stock-financed acquisitions is identical for given firm and
issue characteristics. While this is an intuitive supposition, Baker, Coval, and Stein (2007)
argue that, in the presence of investor inertia, the announcement effects in pure SEOs
should be more negative than in stock-financed acquisitions because investors exhibiting in-
ertia do not resell the acquirer’s stock received in the exchange, while investors in SEOs
have to actively “opt into” buying the new issue. This makes the returns in stock-financed
acquisitions less negative then they might have been in an SEO followed by a takeover. If
this is the case, the investment value creation component of the announcement return
(PCAR) for stock-financed deals could be upward biased.
As noted above this effect is likely to be confronted by the additional price pressure
from merger arbitrageurs who short sell the acquirer’s stock, as shown directly in Mitchell,
Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) and indirectly in the previous section. This phenomenon is
specific to stock-financed acquisitions and is not present in pure SEOs. Thus, the reduced
price pressure from passive investors could be offset by the extra price pressure from merger
arbitrage. We therefore believe that our assumption regarding the similarity of the stock
price effects for given firm and issue characteristics is a plausible one.
5.8 Endogeneity of the Method of Payment Choice
One issue that the above analysis does not take into account is the possible endogeneity of
the method of payment decision. If firms that choose to pay with cash are fundamentally
different from those which choose to pay with equity, then the estimates in Table V could
be biased. Ultimately, the question that we need to answer is “what is the effect of paying
for the acquisition with stock on PCAR for a firm that chose to pay with cash but was just
as likely to pay with equity instead”. Propensity-score matching techniques allow us to ad-
dress this question as well (for a recent application of propensity score matching to the esti-
mation of treatment effects in finance research see Drucker and Puri, 2005). To that end,
stock-financed deals are compared with matched cash-financed deals, where the matching
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is based on a one-dimensional propensity score that is a function of acquirer- and deal-spe-
cific characteristics.
When we implement the matching estimator and match each stock-financed deal to 50
cash deals (results are identical if we use 1 or 10 neighbors) closest on the propensity score
that is a function of all the control variables used in Table V, we find that the treatment ef-
fect of the method of payment is significantly negative when the outcome variable is ACAR
(2.69%), but is not significantly different from zero when the outcome variable is
PCAR (PCAR_LINEAR¼1.42%, PCAR_PROP1¼0.52%, PCAR_PROP10¼0.17%,
PCAR_PROP50¼0.19%) with the exception of the linear prediction method. These re-
sults are the same as those in Table IV where no matching is performed, suggesting that our
findings are robust to controlling for selection on observable characteristics. Ideally,
though, one would want to explicitly model the endogeneity of the payment choice in a
two-stage framework that accounts for selection on unobservable characteristics. This, of
course, requires an instrumental variable that is correlated with payment choices but uncor-
related with the unobservable private information revealed by the decision to issue equity.
Finding a source of such exogenous variation in payment method is an undertaking that is
beyond the scope of our article, but maybe a fruitful avenue for future research.
5.9 Extensions
We have established that stock-financed takeovers are as value creative as (or, more accur-
ately, as value-neutral as) cash-financed deals in terms of the underlying investment deci-
sions, and that the negative announcement effects associated with stock swaps are just a
financing impact due to adverse selection. Although we have focused on public firm acqui-
sitions to demonstrate this idea, our approach is, in fact, more general and can also be
applied to private firm acquisitions, where, on the contrary, stock-financed deals are associ-
ated with higher announcement returns than cash-financed takeovers (Chang, 1998; Fuller,
Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002).
Issuing stock to a small set of private shareholders of the target firm is akin to issuing
equity in a private placement. Incidentally, private placements are associated with signifi-
cant positive announcement effects as documented by Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith
(1993). Applying our logic to the case of private firm acquisitions, announcement returns
in private stock deals can be also thought of as having two distinct components—a takeover
part and a private placement part. It could be the case that, by applying our methods to dis-
entangle the two components, it turns out that the takeover part, which is responsible for
the investment value creation (i.e., PCAR), is actually the same across the two types of
deals, and that the difference in total announcement returns is solely due to the financing
decision. We report the results of this analysis in Table VII.
Our private acquisitions and private placements samples follow the same selection crite-
ria as above.26 Using the conventional ACARs as the dependent variable, we find that pri-
vate acquisitions paid for with stock exhibit returns that are, on average, 0.58% higher
than those paid for with cash (the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%
level), consistent with Chang (1998) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002).
26 The final samples contain 7,128 private firm acquisitions (of them 4,732 are acquisitions of stand-
alone private firms and 2,396 are acquisitions of subsidiaries) with a mean 5-day cumulative ab-
normal return of 1.98% (p-value of 0.000) and 1,473 private placements with a mean 5-day cumula-
tive abnormal return of 0.33% (p-value of 0.371).
192 A. Golubov et al.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/rof/article-abstract/20/1/161/2461397 by guest on 29 July 2020
Table VII. Cross-sectional regressions of PCARs and ACARs—private deals
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regression analysis of PCARs and ACARs for
private firm acquisitions (stand-alone private and subsidiary firms). All variables are defined in
the Appendix. The t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
at the firm level. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. Year and industry fixed effects (coef-
ficients suppressed) are based on calendar year and Fama-French 48 industry classification
dummies, respectively.
Conventional Linear One-to-one 10 nearest 50 nearest
ACAR PCAR PCAR PCAR PCAR
INTERCEPT 0.0037 0.0238 0.0054 0.0048 0.0046
(0.17) (0.71) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
STOCK 0.0058* 0.0018 0.0148*** 0.0037 0.0025
(1.96) (0.57) (4.08) (1.23) (0.84)
LN (MARCAP) 0.0030*** 0.0009 0.0014 0.0032*** 0.0031***
(2.93) (0.86) (1.18) (3.12) (3.03)
BEME 0.0013 0.0031 0.0009 0.0009 0.0016
(0.24) (0.56) (0.15) (0.17) (0.30)
RUN-UP 0.0071** 0.0015 0.0084*** 0.0067** 0.0067**
(2.46) (0.54) (2.67) (2.35) (2.33)
SIGMA 0.1070 0.1962 0.1155 0.0942 0.1119
(0.80) (1.46) (0.78) (0.70) (0.83)
RELSIZE 0.0499*** 0.0132** 0.0599*** 0.0490*** 0.0491***
(8.28) (2.11) (9.54) (8.19) (8.20)
TENDER 0.1086*** 0.1039*** 0.1109*** 0.1021** 0.1077***
(2.75) (2.72) (2.73) (2.49) (2.75)
DIVERSIFIC 0.0043 0.0024 0.0049 0.0041 0.0045*
(1.63) (0.91) (1.61) (1.55) (1.69)
HOSTILE 0.1680*** 0.1342*** 0.1714*** 0.1617*** 0.1659***
(7.17) (5.54) (6.60) (6.97) (7.26)
MULTIBID 0.0193 0.0184 0.0249 0.0259 0.0192
(1.20) (1.02) (1.45) (1.53) (1.21)
LEVERAGE 0.0005 0.0016 0.0041 0.0008 0.0002
(0.07) (0.20) (0.46) (0.10) (0.02)
CASH HOLD 0.0019 0.0046 0.0053 0.0003 0.0011
(0.21) (0.50) (0.53) (0.03) (0.12)
CF/EQ 0.0066 0.0223 0.0094 0.0030 0.0065
(0.36) (1.22) (0.46) (0.16) (0.36)
OPER PERFORM 0.0087 0.0048 0.0107 0.0061 0.0096
(0.62) (0.34) (0.66) (0.43) (0.68)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,329 6,329 6,329 6,329 6,329
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.074 (0.062) 0.036 (0.023) 0.071 (0.059) 0.072 (0.059) 0.074 (0.061)
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Interestingly, when using PCARs purified by subtracting hypothetical private placement re-
turns, we find that in three specifications out of the four the magnitude of the coefficient is
reduced and it loses statistical significance. However, it is positive and statistically signifi-
cant in one specification (one-to-one matching).
It is important to note at this stage that paying with stock in private acquisitions
can indeed be value creative (information effects aside): private targets are opaque and
difficult to value, and paying with stock allows the acquirer to share any overpayment
with the shareholders of the target (see Hansen (1987) for the theoretical model and
Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller (2009) for the empirical evidence). Therefore, our failure
to completely explain away the differential returns in cash and stock private firm acquisi-
tions can be due to this effect.
Finally, we note that the intuition behind our methodology is very broad and can be
applied in other contexts where joint announcements complicate inferences. For instance,
Nayak and Prabhala (2001) report that almost 80% of stock splits by dividend-paying
firms are announced simultaneously with a dividend announcement, which has led re-
searchers to omit such firms from the analysis, leaving a small and, probably, selected sam-
ple. Our approach can effectively deal with this issue.
5.10 Other Sensitivity Tests
The results documented in this article are also robust to the following minor alterations to the
research design: (i) use of (1, þ1) event window for the announcement period return instead
of (2, þ2); (ii) use of market-adjusted abnormal returns instead of market-model-adjusted,
(iii) use of an equally weighted CRSP index as a proxy for the market return instead of value-
weighted; (iv) exclusion of financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-
4999) from both the M&As and the SEOs samples; (v) restricting the M&As sample to
100% acquisitions; (vi) restricting the SEOs sample to only primary issues; (vii) including un-
successful deals in the M&A sample; (viii) replacing LN (MARCAP) with LN (EV), where
EV is the enterprise value, defined as MARCAP plus the book value of short- and long-term
debt taken from Compustat. In all cases, we find that there is no consistently negative effect
of stock payment on PCARs when the results from both linear prediction and propensity-
score matching techniques are taken as a whole.
In addition, we have also addressed the timing of the SEOs with respect to the subse-
quent M&A announcements by the issuing firms as such SEOs might reveal some forth-
coming takeover news to the market. Our results are unchanged when we exclude SEOs by
the M&A sample firms falling within 1 or 2 years prior to, or after, the M&A announce-
ment. We also separately analyze the market reactions to deals by acquirers having recently
performed an SEO. We find that having conducted an SEO within 1 or 2 years prior to an
acquisition further reduces announcement returns for stock deals, but not for cash acquisi-
tions—consistent with severe adverse selection. These results are reported and commented
on in the online Appendix. Finally, we have also extended our analysis to mixed payment
deals, which produced qualitatively similar results. This analysis and the associated discus-
sion can also be found in the online Appendix.
6. Conclusion
We contribute to the debate on the existence of agency costs of overvalued equity and the
resultant suboptimal investment by firms (Jensen, 2005). Using M&A deals as our testing
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ground, we also offer new evidence on whether stock-financed acquisitions destroy value
for shareholders. Our innovation is to empirically implement the argument that a stock-
financed acquisition announcement should be thought of as having two distinct compo-
nents: a takeover component and an equity issue component. Using a sample of SEOs, we
estimate the latter component and disentangle the two parts of the announcement effect.
After the implied equity financing component is taken away from the announcement return
of stock acquirers, the method of payment generally has no further explanatory power in
the cross-section of acquirer returns. This result runs contrary to the predictions regarding
the agency costs of overvalued equity with respect to stock-financed acquisitions. There is,
however, some limited evidence that such agency costs were present during the bubble
period of 1998–2001, and that stock acquirers with large cash hoards may be more prone
to suboptimal deal making.
More broadly, if one accepts that our methodology effectively purges the market reac-
tion to stock mergers from the financing effects and allows capturing the pure value conse-
quences of the underlying investment decisions, our results suggest, for the first time in the
literature, that stock-financed acquisitions are non-value-destructive investment projects.
Coupled with normal or small positive abnormal returns to cash acquirers, these findings
suggest that public firm acquisitions in general are small-to-zero NPV investments. The
lack of large value gains in corporate acquisitions can be interpreted as consistent with the
existence of a competitive market for corporate control.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary data are available at Review of finance online.
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Appendix
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable Definition
Panel A: Dependent variables and the method of payment
ICAR Cumulative abnormal return of the SEO issuer in the 5-day event window
(2, þ2) centered on the announcement (filing) day reported by Thomson
Financial SDC. The expected returns are from a market model with the
parameters estimated over 200 trading days ending 41 days prior to the
announcement. The market return is proxied by CRSP value-weighted
index return.
HCAR Hypothetical stock price reaction in an event of an SEO by the stock acquirer
calculated as a linear prediction (obtained by multiplying the stock acquirer
characteristics by the coefficient estimates from a regression of ICAR on the
corresponding issuer characteristics) or as returns of propensity-score-
matched SEO issuers.
ACAR Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring firm in the 5-day event window
(2, þ2) centered on the announcement day reported by Thomson
Financial SDC. The expected returns are from a market model with the
parameters estimated over 200 trading days ending 41 days prior to the an-
nouncement. The market return is proxied by CRSP value-weighted index
return.
PCAR ACAR–HCAR when the acquisition is stock-financed (STOCK ¼ 1), ACAR
when the acquisitions is cash-financed (STOCK¼ 0).
STOCK Indicator variable: 1 for deals where consideration is 100% stock, 0 for deals
where consideration is 100% cash, as reported by Thomson Financial SDC.
Panel B: Acquirer/issuer characteristics
MARCAP Market capitalization 4 weeks prior to the acquisition/issue announcement
from CRSP (in $ mil. inflation adjusted to 2009 using the US GDP deflator).
BEME Book value of equity divided by market value of equity (shares outstanding
times the closing price) at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the an-
nouncement, all numbers are from Compustat.
RUN-UP Buy-and-hold excess (market-adjusted) return of the firm’s common stock
over the period starting 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the
announcement date from CRSP.
SIGMA Idiosyncratic volatility of the firm’s common stock measured as the standard
deviation of daily excess (market-adjusted) returns from CRSP over the
period starting 205 and ending 6 days before the announcement.
LEVERAGE Total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by
the book value of total assets for the fiscal year prior to acquisition
announcement from Compustat.
CF/EQ Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on com-
mon and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times
the closing stock price at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the
announcement from Compustat.
CASH HOLD Cash and cash equivalents divided by the book value of total assets for the
fiscal year-end immediately prior to the announcement from Compustat.
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Variable Definition
OPER PERFORM Operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of total assets
for the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the announcement from
Compustat.
Panel C: Deal/issue characteristics
DEAL VALUE Value of the deal/issue as reported by Thomson Financial SDC (in $ mil. infla-
tion-adjusted to 2009 using the US GDP deflator).
RELSIZE Value of the deal/issue from Thomson Financial SDC divided by the acquirer/
issuer market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the announcement
from CRSP.
HOSTILE Indicator variable: 1 for deals labeled as “hostile” or “unsolicited” by
Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
DIVERSIFIC Indicator variable: 1 for cross-industry deals, 0 for same industry deals.
Industries are defined using Fama-French 48 industries classification.
TENDER Indicator variable: 1 for tender offers identified as such by Thomson Financial
SDC, 0 otherwise.
MULTIBID Indicator variable: 1 for deals involving competing bidders as reported by
Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
PURE PRIMARY Indicator variable: 1 for equity offers comprising only newly issued shares as
reported by Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
COMBINED Indicator variable: 1 for equity offers which include secondary shares as re-
ported by Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.
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